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The Banality of Counterterrorism ‘After, After 9/11’? Perspectives on the 
Prevent duty from the UK healthcare sector1 
Charlotte Heath-Kelly; Erzsébet Strausz  
 
Abstract: Since 2015, the UK healthcare sector has (along with education and social care) 
been responsibilised for noticing signs of radicalisation and reporting patients to the Prevent 
program. The Prevent Duty frames the integration of healthcare professionals into the UK’s 
counterterrorism effort as the banal extension of safeguarding. But safeguarding has 
previously been framed as the protection of children, and adults with care and support 
needs, from abuse. This paper explores the legitimacy of situating Prevent within 
safeguarding through interviews with safeguarding experts in 6 NHS Trusts and Clinical 
Commissioning Groups. It also describes the factors which NHS staff identified as indicators 
of radicalisation – data which was obtained from an online questionnaire completed by 329 
healthcare professionals. The paper argues that the ‘after, after 9/11’ era is not radically 
distinct from earlier periods of counterterrorism but does contain novel features, such as 
the performance of anticipatory counter-terrorism under the rubric of welfare and care. 
Keywords: Prevent strategy; safeguarding; NHS; healthcare; radicalisation. 
 
Introduction 
The question ‘is there an after, after 9/11?’ forces us to address whether there has been any 
return from the exceptionalised, emergency frame which dominated international politics in 
in the aftermath of 9/11. At face value, the direction of travel in Europe and North America 
is unchanged. The immediate legislative responses to international terrorism of the twenty-
first century - the Contest Strategy (UK) and the Patriot Act (USA) - have not been repealed, 
and the technological advance of counter-terrorism surveillance continues unabated.  
However this paper argues that Countering Violent Extremism policies (CVE) do represent a 
distinctive development in the post-9/11 counter-terrorism repertoire. CVE frameworks are 
now employed across the globe by actors such as the United Nations, the European Union 
as well as individual nation states (Kundnani & Hayes 2018). Their unique selling point is the 
prevention of terrorism through interventions in ‘radicalisation processes’, before criminal 
conspiracy occurs (in the so-called ‘pre-criminal space’). Here, the resources usually 
associated with social welfare policies (like mentoring, housing and education) are reframed 
as terrorism prevention assets (Home Office 2017; 2018). In contradistinction to the 
emergency criminal justice measures of the immediate 9/11 era, this paper focuses on the 
                                                          
1 This research was funded by a Wellcome Trust Seed Award in Humanities and Social Science (205365/Z/16/Z) 
banality of the Prevent Duty in the UK where social care, education and healthcare workers 
are now engaged in the prevention of terrorism (Ragazzi 2017). 
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 placed a statutory duty on specified 
authorities within the UK’s public sector to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people 
from being drawn into terrorism’ (Home Office 2015: 2). In practice, this has meant that 
schools, colleges, universities, prisons, social services, NHS trusts, NHS Clinical 
Commissioning Groups2 (CCG’s), and private healthcare providers on the NHS standard 
contract now perform counterterrorism – under the rubric of safeguarding. These providers 
deliver Prevent related training to their staff, promote the importance of the Prevent Duty 
to their staff, and process Prevent referrals made about colleagues, students, patients and 
clients.  
The use of health and education sectors to support counterterrorism is unique to England, 
Wales and Scotland. The Prevent Strategy has not even been rolled out to the entire UK 
(given the specific provisions of Good Friday Agreement, the Prevent Strategy does not 
apply in Northern Ireland). While some European nations utilise community policing and 
prison services to identify and deter potential radicals, it is much rarer for the non-judicial 
sectors to be involved in counter-radicalisation. The Netherlands is an exception and has 
begun encouraging youth workers and educators to promote counter-radicalisation3 
agendas. But Britain is alone in making its educational, health, and social care sectors legally 
responsible for counter-radicalisation.   
In this unique context of policy implementation, this chapter explores how counter-
radicalisation has been integrated into the healthcare sector. The authors conducted a 
twelve month pilot study, funded by the Wellcome Trust, which evaluated the performance 
of Prevent Duty safeguarding by NHS trusts and Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG’s) in 
the Midlands region of England4. Using expert interviews with NHS safeguarding 
professionals, discourse analysis of the WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) 
training DVD and a survey of staff attitudes (N=329) towards the Prevent Duty, we explored 
how Prevent is performed within the NHS’ safeguarding remit.  
                                                          
2 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG’s) are NHS organisations set up after the Health and Social Care Act of 
2012 to organise the delivery of healthcare services. Each CCG includes all of the General Practitioner groups in 
its geographical area, so that GP’s and clinicians can influence commissioning decisions for their region. 
3 The Netherlands’ ‘Integrated Approach to Combatting Jihadism’ [Actieprogramma Integrale Aanpak 
Jihadisme Overzicht maatregelen en acties] policy of 2014 outlines the potential for youth workers and 
educators to prevent radicalisation: 
https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/detail?did=2014D2934&id=2014D29343 (last accessed 03 
November 2017). 
4 The Midlands has a population of over 10 million people and is constituted by the counties of Derbyshire, 
Herefordshire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland, Shropshire, 
Staffordshire, Warwickshire, and Worcestershire. The biggest cities in the Midlands are Birmingham, Coventry, 
Leicester, Nottingham and Stoke-on-Trent. 
Our study showed that NHS staff are, on the whole, accepting of their new responsibilities 
under the Prevent Duty and comfortable with the training provided. However our survey 
also revealed that staff knowledge of specific ‘radicalisation indicators’ is drawn not from 
official training but from popular culture representations of ISIS and radicalism. WRAP 
training encourages staff to intuit the presence of radicalisation in staff and patients, rather 
than providing details of explicit ‘signs’ to be reported. We found that this has led NHS staff 
to rely on the media for their understandings of terrorism and radicalisation. Furthermore, 
despite the popular acceptance of the Prevent Duty as a form of safeguarding, our expert 
interviewees unanimously commented on the imperfect fit between the Prevent Duty and 
other forms of safeguarding expected of the NHS. 
Unlike broader safeguarding protocols, Prevent safeguarding is not restricted to adults with 
‘care and support needs’. NHS England therefore defines all citizens as potentially 
vulnerable to radicalisers and opens the possibility for care practitioners to intervene upon 
their lives. This extension of interventions across the entire population (rather than limiting 
them to those persons with care and support needs) creates a tension with the liberal 
foundations of British political life. A distinctive feature of counterterrorism ‘after, after 
9/11’ is, then, that care can be positioned as an anti-terrorism measure – and counter-
terrorism as a care intervention; such is the normalisation of the counterterrorism within 
society ‘after, after 9/11’. 
 
Prevent in the NHS: Academic Studies 
The majority of academic literature on Prevent in UK public services addresses the 
performance of the duty in the particular contexts of education (Choudhury 2017; Miah 
2013; Thomas 2016), youth work (Lynch 2013; McDonald 2011) and social work 
(McKendrick & Finch 2017). Studies exploring the role of the healthcare sector in Prevent 
are beginning to emerge, but at a slower pace. Research access to the NHS can be a lengthy 
and complicated procedure involving a primary application to the HRA (Health Research 
Authority), unfamiliar terminologies (social scientific research is often not recognised as 
‘research’ but as a ‘service evaluation’), and secondary research access applications to each 
local NHS trust R&I department. These difficulties render studies of Prevent in the NHS 
slower to develop.  
To date, literature on the Prevent Duty in healthcare can be divided into two streams: 
debates in forensic psychiatry about the scientific reliability of extremism risk scoring tools; 
and social scientific research into the NHS as a counter-radicalisation actor. This literature 
review focuses only on the latter.  
In the field of Psychiatry, David Goldberg et al. (2017) have recently problematized the use 
of the term ‘pre-criminal space’ in NHS England Prevent Training and Competencies 
documentation. To foster acceptance in the healthcare sector, the term situates the 
positioning of Prevent as a safeguarding and protection measure. Intervening to protect 
people in the ‘pre-criminal’ space emphasizes the separation of Prevent safeguarding from 
judicial measures. As the Goldberg et al. rightly point out, the obscure term ‘pre-criminal 
space’ does not appear in Home Office Prevent policies nor in any other NHS safeguarding 
policy: in policy terms, it is unique to NHS England’s Prevent Guidance. They explore the 
etymology and usage of ‘pre-criminal space’, arguing that it operates as both metaphor and 
analogy – smoothing and bridging the discourses of the health and criminal justice sectors, 
and persuading NHS professionals to comply with the duty (Goldberg et al. 2017). 
Other academic research into the Prevent Duty focuses on the mass responsibilisation of 
healthcare workers for counterterrorism detection and prevention. Heath-Kelly (2017a; 
2017b) has explored how the Prevent Duty expands the application of preventative 
counterterrorism to the entire population, rather than deploying it upon smaller suspect 
communities. The training of the 1.3 million NHS workers to report radicalisation 
demonstrates a transition of security apparatus away from security professionals (such as 
counter-terrorism officers) who possess formal training, towards a far looser type of 
counterterrorism ‘expertise’. In the NHS, a one or two hour training session in front of the 
‘Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent’ (WRAP) DVD qualifies a staff member to detect 
and report radicalisation. The minimal training for such a sensitive task shows that central 
government have prioritised large scale reporting of radicalisation suspicions across the 
population, rather than targeted and precise counterterrorism measures (Heath-Kelly 
2017a; 2017b). Indeed, upon the release of the 2013 Prevent Guidance document ‘Building 
Partnerships, Staying Safe’, Director of Nursing Hilary Garratt wrote to all CCG 
commissioning leads and emphasised that the size of the NHS (which makes 1 million 
patient contacts every 36 hours), rather than any specific expertise, qualified it as a key 
partner within the Prevent Strategy (Garratt 2013). Size matters, it seems, in the new 
Prevent Duty. 
Outside these formal studies, various healthcare professionals have also taken to the pages 
of academic and professional journals to voice concern, and occasionally support, for the 
Prevent Duty in the NHS. Derek Summerfield, a consultant at South London and Maudsley 
NHS Trust, wrote in BJPsych Bulletin that compelling medical staff to attend Prevent training 
is: 
a corrosion of the ethics of the doctor-patient relationship, and is to prime us for an activity 
which is a duplicitous deviation from the medical assessment, advice and treatment that has 
brought the patient to us (Summerfield 2016). 
Dr Rosemary Rizq has similar concerns about the conflation of healthcare and protection 
with the reporting of terrorist deviance. She argues that surveillance and control insidiously 
invade the consulting room through the Prevent Duty, turning the patient requiring 
healthcare into an already-securitised risk, and forbidding the free play of speech so 
essential for therapy (Rizq 2017).  
 
Prevent as Safeguarding? 
This perceived clash between medical ethics and reporting radicalisation suspicions is 
complicated by the positioning of the Prevent Duty as a safeguarding measure. Central 
government policy has explicitly presented the Prevent Duty as an additional patient 
safeguarding measure which entails no extra responsibilities on behalf of clinical and non-
clinical staff (Department of Health 2011: 3). Accordingly, NHS England places responsibility 
for Prevent training and the processing of Prevent referrals with Trust and CCG safeguarding 
teams. These safeguarding experts provide WRAP training to staff with the Home Office 
DVD and script, process Prevent queries (filtering out inappropriate referrals), and 
determine which queries are referred to Local Authorities and the police.  Safeguarding 
discursively and operationally situates Prevent in the NHS. 
While safeguarding is more loosely defined as a ‘protective intervention’ in the educational 
and social care sectors, safeguarding processes in the NHS are tightly defined. Healthcare 
safeguarding is designed to protect those with care and support needs (like learning 
disabilities, severe mental health conditions, dementia, drug and alcohol addiction) from 
abuse, where they cannot protect themselves. They are a necessary societal protection for 
those with reduced individual capacity or agency. The Care Act was passed in 2014 to legally 
enforce the safeguarding of vulnerable people, and it states that local authorities must 
intervene to support adults in cases where: 
where a local authority has reasonable cause to suspect that an adult in its area (whether or 
not ordinarily resident there)— (a) has needs for care and support (whether or not the 
authority is meeting any of those needs), (b) is experiencing, or is at risk of, abuse or neglect, 
and (c) as a result of those needs is unable to protect himself or herself against the abuse or 
neglect or the risk of it. (2) The local authority must make (or cause to be made) whatever 
enquiries it thinks necessary to enable it to decide whether any action should be taken in the 
adult’s case (Care Act 2014, c.23, section 42, emphasis added).  
If an adult has care and support needs, faces the risk of abuse, and cannot protect 
themselves, then the individual’s agency ceases to be a paramount principle. Rightly, the 
Local Authority becomes duty bound to intervene in these situations. 
In the NHS, safeguarding teams take reports about vulnerable patients who are at risk of 
abuse (physical, sexual, financial) and liaise with the Local Authority, and that patient, to put 
a care package in place. But under the Prevent Duty, safeguarding protocols are activated in 
cases where no care and support need exists. In Prevent protocols, the explicit provision 
regarding ‘care and support needs’ in the Care Act is watered down to a suggestion of 
‘vulnerabilities’ – creating concerns that the presumption of adult agency has been side-
lined. 
Home Office and NHS England policy guidance presents radicalisation as a process of 
abusive exploitation performed upon ‘vulnerable’ persons. But vulnerability, under the 
Prevent Duty guidance protocols, is no longer a formal state of reduced capacity (like care 
and support needs) – rather ‘vulnerability’ is extended to potentially cover the entire 
population. Anyone, with or without care needs, can be the subject of a Prevent 
safeguarding inquiry. How is this interference in a person’s agency justified, before the 
criminal threshold is reached? One’s vulnerability (and the need for safeguarding 
intervention) is constituted through a circular argument: simply by being associated with a 
radicalisation referral, a person must already have been vulnerable to extremist influence. 
The assumption plays out that no person with full capacity, or in control of their life, would 
support political extremism or terrorism – thus any presumed sympathy denotes reduced 
capacity or ‘vulnerability’. 
While any person can be subject to a Prevent safeguarding referral, regardless of their 
formal capacity level, the Department of Health does provide some guidance on ‘factors 
which put people at risk of exploitation by radicalisers’. Worryingly, these racialize 
‘vulnerability’ to extremism. The factors emphasize the migration status of an individual as a 
point of vulnerability to extremism, their ‘traditional’ family life (in a context where 
‘traditional’ acts as a synonym for people of colour), and their ‘religious/cultural heritage’. 
For example, the first factor highlighted by the Department of Health as indicating 
radicalisation vulnerability is ‘identity crisis’; but this is characterised as:  
Adolescents/vulnerable adults who are exploring issues of identity can feel both distant from 
their parents/family and cultural and religious heritage, and uncomfortable with their place 
in society around them (Department of Health 2011: 10). 
Identity crisis seems to be associated here with second or third generation immigrants, 
positioned between cultures. Apparently ‘identity crisis’ is not a potential experience that 
anyone could experience, only specific and racialized groups.  
The second factor in the Department of Health’s list of radicalisation vulnerability factors is 
‘personal crisis’ (characterised as the ‘isolation of the vulnerable individual from the 
traditional certainties of family life’ [emphasis added]). Following on from the first racialized 
indicator, this invocation of ‘traditional family life’ reads like a synonym for racialized groups 
in society. The third factor in vulnerability relates to an individual’s ‘personal circumstances’. 
We all have ‘personal circumstances’, but these are characterised by the Department of 
Health in terms of cultural, religious and raced identities leading towards radicalisation 
vulnerability:  
Personal Circumstances: The experience of migration, local tensions or events affecting 
families in countries of origin may contribute to alienation from UK values and a decision to 
cause harm to symbols of the community or state (Department of Health 2011: 10). 
 
Finally, unemployment/underemployment, and criminality are listed (without racialized 
undertones) as factors which may make a person vulnerable to radicalisation (Department 
of Health 2011: 10).  
Without a clinical evidence base or NICE guidance, these factors replace the formal care and 
support needs which are central to other forms of NHS safeguarding. These ‘factors’ fudge 
the centrality of care and support needs to safeguarding (Care Act 2014, c.23, section 42) by 
repeatedly invoking the ‘vulnerability’ of a person experiencing disenfranchisement or 
ennui, but provide no other basis for the interruption of their agency by a safeguarding 
action.  
Without care and support needs, an adult should be entitled to live uninterrupted by the 
state unless they request support and assistance. Indeed NHS safeguarding policy enshrines 
the principle of agency, in all cases apart from where ‘coercion and undue influence’ might 
apply: 
Adults have a legal right to make their own decisions, even if they are unwise, as  long as 
they have capacity to make that decision and are free from coercion or  undue influence 
(NHS England 2015: 16).  
 
Given the usual presumption of agency for adults without care and support needs, Prevent 
in the NHS stretches normal safeguarding customs and protocols to their limit. The ‘coercion 
and undue influence’ usually understood to constitute impaired agency are severe 
situational constraints. For example, people experiencing domestic violence or human 
trafficking can receive safeguarding assistance despite not necessarily possessing ‘care and 
support needs’ - because they are experiencing significant coercion and abuse from which 
they cannot reasonably be expected to protect themselves.  
But is it legitimate for Prevent to equate the coercion experienced by human trafficking and 
domestic violence victims, trapped within appalling situations and experiencing dramatic 
constraints upon their agency, to those engaging with extreme political opinions and those 
who voice them? Given the potentially dramatic contrast, it would be far more appropriate 
to presume that individuals retain agency and can engage with political ideas freely. While 
the intention of safeguarding practitioners is to keep people safe from travelling to war 
zones or becoming involved in terrorism, the Prevent Duty involves a significant departure 
from the presumption of adult agency in cases where there is often no cognitive or coercive 
impediment.  
In the next section, we highlight the testimonies of safeguarding leads within NHS trusts and 
CCG’s on the imperfect fit between Prevent and Safeguarding. These safeguarding experts 
experienced significant dissonance between their desire to protect potential victims of 
radicalisers, and their knowledge that safeguarding interventions explicitly require the 
recipient to have ‘care and support needs’ to justify the intervention upon agency.  
 
NHS Safeguarding Experts on the Prevent Strategy 
Our interviews with safeguarding experts shed light on some of the key features of 
Prevent’s uneasy situation within existing safeguarding infrastructure. Most of the 
safeguarding experts we interviewed held conflicting views and beliefs with regards to the 
place, function, and broader implications of Prevent referrals made by NHS staff, even if 
they had come to accept, endorse or re-appropriate the Prevent Duty. These dissonances in 
how safeguarding experts see their role reveal important tensions and concerns that arise 
when a counterterrorism reporting structure is embedded within an otherwise evidence-
based medical culture.  
Normal safeguarding referrals utilize a transparent process which is subject to audit and 
clinical governance. They follow an approach of person-centred care that presupposes the 
person’s consent and, in line with general professional guidelines in the NHS, foregrounds 
patient choice. However, the tension between Prevent and the medical duty to provide care 
was immediately noted by some of our expert interviewees. One GP we spoke to noted that 
with Prevent the very object and objective of protection changes. ‘When you do 
safeguarding, the person sat in front of you is your main concern because you’re trying to 
protect that person. Whereas with this, you’re protecting the state from that person’ 
(Consultant Psychiatrist B and GP 2, 2017). This underlying shift makes Prevent a 
controversial subject within the NHS, but also demonstrates an imperfect fit with existing 
safeguarding structures which necessitates a constant negotiation of the Prevent Duty by 
healthcare professionals.  
Upon the introduction of Prevent to the NHS, a CCG Prevent Lead (responsible for giving the 
Prevent training) recalled that the policy ‘didn’t originally sit very well with [them] or a lot of 
[their] team’ (CCG Prevent Lead B, 2017). These concerns reflect the problematic situation 
of Prevent within NHS safeguarding. Prevent aims to orchestrate a new way of ‘seeing’ and 
performing safeguarding by cultivating an ‘awareness’ for vulnerable people being at risk of 
radicalisation. Prevent sits in tension with the approaches, principles and definitions of 
safeguarding under the Care Act. These tensions become apparent when one attempts to 
understand the type of ‘abuse’ upon which Prevent intervenes. Normal safeguarding 
processes exist to protect vulnerable people from financial, physical and sexual abuse, 
where they cannot protect themselves. For Prevent interventions, the closest fit would be 
protection from psychological abuse, qua domestic violence safeguarding. But even this fit is 
imperfect. One expert practitioner of Prevent safeguarding understood radicalisation as a 
‘type of grooming’ evident when ‘people are being harassed, they're being groomed, they 
may not have any control over what they're being drawn into […]. Particularly if they're very 
vulnerable and they don't recognise it’ (Safeguarding Expert P, 2017). Yet a different Prevent 
trainer pointed out to us that the notion of ‘vulnerability’ is used and talked about very 
differently between the safeguarding and Prevent contexts. Instead of a focus on ‘care and 
support needs’ what is emphasized is a ‘complex set of grievances’ related to ideology, 
exclusion and identity. For example: 
Prevent, to me, is about finding people who are at the cusp in their lives of not having 
anything else other than somebody saying, “why don’t you do this?”  […] And for a young 
Muslim child growing up, I suppose, who has a strong family bond and then suddenly is an 
isolated teenager, racially abused perhaps, can’t find work, you’re going to start connecting 
with things that perhaps, you know, you see and hear and read, and to deal with your own 
feelings of anger: “oh, why haven’t I got a job?  Why am I in this position?” And that’s who 
Prevent is meant to protect, but the fact that it sits under Safeguarding, I don’t think it sits 
comfortably with Safeguarding (CCG Safeguarding Expert C, 2017). 
Here the type of abuse that NHS staff are duty-bound to protect against seems to be 
exclusion, rather than the existing typologies of abuse within safeguarding regimes. 
The introduction of the Prevent Duty as a form of safeguarding protection has led to 
professional dissonance. During our interviews with safeguarding experts, it was common 
for them to first make the case that Prevent fits well within safeguarding - on the basis that 
the professional intuition already developed within safeguarding practice is an appropriate 
tool for detecting radicalization. In this regard, the Prevent Duty requirements made sense 
to staff. Safeguarding professionals were described as having a particular nose for detecting 
the unfamiliar, understood as a ‘gut instinct that there’s something, but I don’t know what’ 
(Safeguarding Experts F and J, 2017). But interviewees would then draw out some 
differences in how this intuition is utilized within Prevent. The safeguarding remit, they 
acknowledged, is now extended beyond people with care and support needs. Furthermore, 
in normal safeguarding the emphasis is on ‘making the person immediately safe,’ which is 
not the case in Prevent (Ibid).  
However, the ways in which Prevent stretches beyond the scope of safeguarding was 
(despite these inconsistencies) often seen in a positive light. The point was made that in 
actual practice, normal safeguarding also extends beyond the strict definitions of the Care 
Act. Safeguarding experts F and J framed this work as a banal type of intervention upon 
society: ‘like any one of us […] have been a victim of something, but haven’t got care and 
support needs, but still need some signposting’ (Ibid). In this sense, they argue that 
‘although it’s different, I suppose, [Prevent] is not that different, because some of what we 
do sits in and out of safeguarding as it sits under the Care Act’ (Ibid).  
Here, Prevent was framed as ‘early help,’ before something ‘reaches a critical point’. These 
safeguarding experts saw the Prevent Duty as complementary to the Care Act as ‘we're not 
always working completely in line with the Care Act, because there's more to it, and we will 
try and prevent things before they get to that point’ (Ibid).  
Other safeguarding experts also made similar rhetorical moves which positioned Prevent 
within the safeguarding regime and existing practice. It is ‘almost parental care’ for an 
individual rather than being ‘explicit and saying, actually, this is an act... this is dangerous, 
this is potentially dangerous (CCG Safeguarding Expert C, 2017).  
This is interesting, because it shows how the provisions of the Care Act and the Prevent Duty 
have been appropriated and renegotiated by healthcare professionals. Prevent’s vagueness 
on ‘vulnerability’ has been re-appropriated to redirect attention to the needs of, and 
rectifying the exclusion of, the person. One interviewee used it as a ‘pathway’ – something 
like a personal care-centred corrective to the Care Act – in order to secure resources for 
clients who would otherwise have fallen through the safety net of social care (Ibid). 
Yet this negotiation of ambiguities is also practiced by Central Government, who have 
manufactured an overlap between NHS safeguarding and the anticipatory surveillance of 
potential radicals. Unlike normal safeguarding, Prevent referrals from the NHS are fed 
directly to the police as a matter of routine. In regular clinical practice, collaboration with 
the police follows established procedures: in cases where clear threats to personal safety 
are voiced, the police are called first and concerns about health come second. But Prevent 
operates before this threshold of explicit threat, and involves the police as a matter of 
course. If a healthcare professional makes a Prevent referral, it is first screened by the 
safeguarding team before those cases deemed Prevent-worthy progress to the stage of 
police disambiguation (Home Office 2017: 5-6). The healthcare professional as well as the 
safeguarding team screen for signs of ‘radicalisation’ that stop short of threats to personal 
safety, before involving the police. But what kind of expertise informs this professional 
judgement? 
Trainers and safeguarding teams are not experts in counterterrorism: they receive the same 
WRAP training as those they train, while also receiving occasional briefings from the 
Regional Prevent Coordinator. Interviewees confirmed that there is an ‘inclination’ within 
the NHS to share information with the police and make a referral in order to avoid risks. 
However, they also acknowledged that Prevent is an essentially ‘grey area’ in that ‘what we 
now get involved with is ‘if there's potential’ - and this is where it's really grey with Prevent’ 
(CCG Prevent Lead B, 2017). This is particularly worrying as doubt is actively discouraged in 
the process: as a CCG safeguarding expert noted, what is looked for under Prevent is ‘a little 
bit of concern’ about someone’s behaviour, which will be triaged by the safeguarding team 
– so the one who makes the referral doesn’t have to ‘own’ it (CCG Safeguarding Expert C, 
2017). As another CCG Prevent Lead admitted, ‘I'm not sure that [a referral] will help some 
people. I think it runs contrary to safeguarding under the Care Act in terms of how that 
works’ (CCG Prevent Lead B, 2017).  
Concerns about the potential inaccuracy and stigmatization involved in this haphazard 
reporting structure are assuaged through policy discussion of the ‘pre-criminal space’. 
Prevent documentation, as well as interviewee statements, repeatedly emphasized that 
referees could come to little harm from the referral process – given that they would not 
obtain a criminal record or penalty. We also discovered that people referred to Prevent are 
often unaware that such a referral has been made. Their consent only needs to be obtained 
if the process reaches the stage where the Local Authority consider involving Channel. While 
policy documents encourage social care sectors to obtain consent when making Prevent 
referrals, they are not obliged to do so (NHS England 2017: 15-16). And given the 
controversial and sensitive nature of a Prevent-referral conversation, our interviewees 
consistently left us with the impression that consent is usually sidelined (unlike in normal 
safeguarding procedures) or is fudged as a vague reference to ‘concerns’ and obtaining 
unspecified ‘support’ for the patient (CCG Safeguarding Expert C, 2017).  
One particular Prevent trainer was particularly explicit about the contradiction they saw 
between the Prevent brief and normal safeguarding procedures of obtaining consent: 
‘You're supposed to ask their permission […] I don't know whether anybody does. But you're 
supposed to ask for their consent. “I think you're being radicalised, I think you want to blow 
us up, would you mind if I referred you?” (Safeguarding Expert A, 2017).  
But, regardless of not receiving a criminal record or even not knowing one has been 
referred, being put through a referral process could be highly stigmatizing for individuals 
and breaks the trust established between healthcare and local communities. Several expert 
practitioners noted that: ‘I think it's very difficult to come back from a Prevent referral’ 
(Safeguarding Expert A, 2017) and ‘that person’s life can be blighted [by a Prevent referral] 
in all sorts of ways. Professionally, personally, if you’re a child at school and nowadays, 
everyone knows you’ve been referred […] That label will stay with you, well after the 
investigation and possible trial’ (Consultant Psychiatrist B and GP 2, 2017).  The referral 
process was also thought to have broader negative effects upon the relationship between 
healthcare professionals and their local communities: 
If that leaks out that you did an inappropriate Prevent referral, you break down your 
relationship with that community, your patients, that patient’s family. They’ll talk to other 
patients. She did the referral to Prevent. She thought I was a terrorist or whatever. It would 
be a total disaster, where you’ve worked so hard to create a safe space for these people to 
come and talk about some really sensitive issues. You have to think before you do that 
(Consultant Psychiatrist B and GP 2, 2017). 
In essence, safeguarding experts are aware of the imperfect fit between the Prevent Duty 
and safeguarding protocols. However they mitigated those discrepancies by emphasising 
how their everyday (non-Prevent) safeguarding practice also sometimes exceeds the bounds 
of the Care Act, and by renegotiating aspects of the Duty. During our interviews it became 
clear that some safeguarding experts assuaged their concerns about being implicated in 
predictive detection, by reframing the Prevent Duty as a way to reallocate resources to 
those deprived by the economic context of austerity. We now turn away from expert 
testimony to explore the everyday experiences of NHS staff with Prevent – specifically the 
training provided to NHS staff on Prevent and their interpretations of it.  
 
Description of the content of WRAP training   
One of the many tasks of NHS safeguarding teams is to deliver WRAP training to Trust/CCG 
staff. The ‘Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent’ training lasts one-to-two hours and 
involves the screening of clips from the Home Office provided DVD. Since 2016, WRAP 
trainers need not attend a ‘train the trainer’ workshop; they are qualified by simply having 
previously attended a WRAP session and by achieving their line manager’s approval for 
taking on the role. In an NHS England National Prevent Update, cascaded to all safeguarding 
teams and prevent leads in the NHS in August 2016, staff were informed that: 
 
 
(NHS England 2016: 2-3) 
No specific expertise is required to deliver Prevent training, because the role involves 
reading from the Home Office approve script for the session and interspersing the 
monologue with clips from the DVD. But in the course of our interviews with Prevent leads 
across the Midlands, it became clear that no-one found it possible or effective to stick to the 
script. Some trainers reported that they use jokes about the training to lighten the 
atmosphere, whereas others integrated discussion of current events into the session. 
The ‘Facilitators Workbook’ provided by the Home Office suggests that trainers tailor their 
session to the level required to ‘achieve buy-in’ from the audience. For management 
audiences, the Home Office recommend that this might only involve playing the ‘what is 
Prevent’ clip alongside one of the case studies contained on the DVD. However the 
workbook then states that there is a minimum content threshold for the session to be 
considered a WRAP. The relationship between full WRAP, and the recommended session for 
management audiences, remains unclear: 
 
(Home Office undated: 2) 
After the introduction of Prevent, the Workbook then instructs the trainer to proceed by 
choosing one of the case studies included on the DVD: either ‘Al Qaeda’ related 
radicalisation, or ‘Far Right’. Emphasis is placed on choosing the clip which ‘best suits your 
audience’, and ensuring that the second clip used later reflects a different ideological 
standpoint. Interestingly the Facilitator’s Workbook then explicitly scripts the trainer in a 
fake ‘trust-building admission’, designed to win over their audience. The trainer is advised to 
reveal that they once found it hard to accept Prevent as a form of safeguarding, and how 
they overcame that perspective by ‘recognising that their conception of terrorism was too 
narrow’. This, the Workbook advises, will build trust that can later be exploited by 
‘educating the audience’ with the iceberg metaphor of terrorism and enable you to ‘assert 
your authority for the rest of the session’: 
  
(Home Office undated: 4). 
The Facilitator’s Workbook clearly shows that the training package aims to deflect criticism 
that Prevent does not fit within NHS safeguarding protocols. The aim of the training is not to 
engage open discussion but to embed the duty to report radicalisation concerns to one’s 
line manager or safeguarding team.   
Similarly, the internal narrative of the Facilitator’s Workbook instructs trainers to control the 
discussion of case studies from the DVD. Rather than allowing flippant suggestions of 
vulnerability indicators, or ‘shouting out’, the trainer is repeatedly instructed to focus the 
discussion on emotional states that might lead to radicalisation: 
 
(Home Office undated: 6) 
Through the policing of discussion possibilities, and the threat of being put on the spot by 
the trainer, the audience are drilled to accept vague emotional and social states (family 
upheaval; low self-esteem; social exclusion) as precipitating factors in radicalisation. NHS 
staff are never trained in specific behavioural signs that indicate radicalisation, but rather 
instructed to adopt an attitude of suspicion towards emotional states. 
Given the multiple contexts in which family upheaval, low self-esteem and social exclusion 
are manifest, the indicators of radicalisation are presented in very broad terms within 
WRAP. So what scenarios do NHS professionals think they are supposed to report? The 
second stage of our study involved testing NHS staff attitudes towards the Prevent Training 
through a questionnaire, and asking what scenarios they consider to be reportable as a 
Prevent query. 
Everyday NHS Staff Attitudes to the Prevent Duty and WRAP training 
Our questionnaire was developed to capture data around each participant’s pay grade, the 
NHS Trust/CCG for whom they work, their confidence in the WRAP training, the behaviours 
which they would consider reporting as a Prevent query, and their perceptions of the social 
functions of the Prevent Duty (safeguarding or surveillance). The questionnaire was hosted 
on a University of Warwick server, gained ethical clearance from the University’s Biomedical 
Sciences Research Ethics Committee, and was distributed to the workforces of each trust 
and CCG participating in the study by their Head of Safeguarding. In total, 329 NHS staff 
completed the questionnaire. 
 
The uptake between participating Trusts and CCG’s was imbalanced. 76% of responses were 
drawn from a mental health trust in a non-priority Prevent area of the Midlands; 15% came 
from an Acute Trust in a non-priority area; 3% came from CCG staff in a non-priority area; 
and the remaining respondents either didn’t specify their employer or were employed in 
various other trusts across the UK. These ‘others’ discovered the survey through 
publicisation by the MEND network (Muslim Engagement and Development). We did 
attempt to obtain research access to Trusts and CCG’s in Prevent priority areas but we were 
not successful. 
 
After obtaining contextual details about the participant’s pay grade (to establish the degree 
of seniority they possess) and previous safeguarding training received, we asked 
respondents to grade how well WRAP (or other forms of Prevent training) explained the 
signs of radicalisation. We were interested to know how NHS staff felt about the training, 
given that our content analysis of WRAP demonstrated significant vagueness around the 
communication of radicalisation signs. Interestingly, 71% of respondents graded the training 
positively (marking it as, or above, ‘7 out of 10’) in this regard: 
Figure 1: Grade how well Prevent Training Explained the Signs of Radicalisation: 
 
We interpret this positive reaction to the training’s communication of radicalisation 
indicators as also being an endorsement of radicalisation as the interruptible process which 
leads to terrorism. If a respondent was unconvinced by the radicalisation narrative put forth 
by government and media, then we argue that they would have marked the training as ‘bad’ 
or ‘extremely bad’ on this scale.  
Similarly positive results were obtained when we asked participants to reflect on their 
comfort or discomfort with the material presented during their Prevent training. 72% of 
respondents graded themselves as ‘comfortable’ or ‘extremely comfortable’ with the 
training materials.   
Figure 2: Grade how comfortable you were with the material presented during Prevent 
training 
 
 
At first glance, these findings tend to support the conclusions of a study which explores the 
roll-out of Prevent in education; specifically that the majority of public sector respondents 
accept the core government narrative that Prevent should be understood as part of their 
safeguarding duties (Busher et al. 2017). However, when we directly asked healthcare 
professionals whether they understood the Prevent Duty to be a form of safeguarding, our 
results became far more ambiguous. Only 47% reported agreement with the statement that 
“Prevent is just safeguarding. It is the same as safeguarding people from domestic abuse, 
financial abuse and sexual abuse”. Slightly over 30% of people ‘didn’t know’ whether 
Prevent fits the profile of safeguarding, whereas 22% disagreed with the statement: 
Figure 3: Prevent is just safeguarding. It is the same as safeguarding people from domestic 
abuse, financial abuse and sexual abuse    
 
 
 
This move towards ambiguity when directly questioned about Prevent’s status as 
safeguarding is very interesting.  When compared to similar research in the education sector 
(Busher et al. 2017) it suggests that the context of safeguarding in health affects 
respondent’s attitudes towards the Duty. In healthcare, unlike education, safeguarding is 
associated with protective intervention upon adults with ‘care and support needs’. Our 
results show that the majority of healthcare professionals (in our study) are accepting of the 
Prevent Duty’s place in health, and are comfortable with its requirements; however this 
acceptance does not signify a similar acceptance that Prevent is safeguarding. Results for 
that question were significantly split, with less than 50% of respondents agreeing with the 
Department of Health’s framing of Prevent as safeguarding.  
Our survey continued by exploring healthcare professionals’ attitudes towards various 
scenarios and whether they would constitute grounds for making a Prevent query. We 
developed these questions to probe deeper into the pedagogical effects of WRAP training. 
WRAP is quite vague on specific indicators of radicalisation and instead emphasizes the 
wide-ranging emotional states which ‘make a person vulnerable’ to extremism, like family 
upheaval, low self-esteem, and social exclusion (Home Office undated: 6).  
One of the most significant findings was that healthcare professionals’ confidence in their 
ability to spot radicalisation fell away when we introduced mildly complex scenarios. For 
example, we asked respondents to grade their confidence in distinguishing radicalisation 
from someone’s interest in Middle Eastern politics and wars. Only 1 in 3 respondents 
reported having any degree of confidence that they could make the distinction. 56% of 
participants stated that they ‘didn’t know’ if they could distinguish interest in Middle 
Eastern politics and wars from radicalisation, and 11% were explicitly unconfident to tell the 
difference. 
Figure 4: Grade how confident you feel to tell the difference between someone 
experiencing radicalisation and someone with an interest in Middle Eastern politics and 
wars  
 
This represents significant ambiguity about the character of radicalisation and its 
relationship to someone’s general interest in current and/or political affairs. This finding 
was also apparent when we asked healthcare professionals’ to consider whether someone’s 
possession of radical philosophy necessitated making a Prevent Duty query. We deliberately 
did not qualify what we meant by ‘radical Islamic/anarchist philosophy’ in the survey, to see 
if respondents queried the definition. It is notoriously difficult to classify philosophy as 
radical or non-radical. However, healthcare professionals felt extremely confident to 
understand the difference, without specific training on the matter. Only one respondent 
(from a sample of 329) left comments on the survey about potential difficulties in 
distinguishing radical from non-radical philosophy. 
Leaving aside the unspecified nature of radical philosophy, 70% of respondents were 
‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ to make a Prevent referral about someone on the basis of 
radical philosophy possession. Only 22% were ‘unlikely’ or ‘extremely unlikely’ to make such 
a referral. 8% said that they ‘didn’t know’ if they would make such a referral: 
Figure 5: If a patient or staff member possessed books about radical Islamic philosophers or 
radical anarchism, how likely is it that you would make a safeguarding query?  
 We conclude from this that healthcare professionals feel inappropriately confident to judge 
whether philosophical books are radical, and that they are worryingly inclined to suspect 
radicalisation solely from the possession of radical philosophy. Academic research suggests 
that the philosophically and religiously literate are actually less susceptible to radicalisation 
(Coolsaet 2015; Roy 2011), and WRAP training makes no mention of philosophy books as an 
indicator of concern, so we believe that respondents are drawing their attitudes from 
popular culture rather than official training or academic research. 
Our suspicion that respondents are drawing their understanding of radicalisation from 
popular culture is further confirmed by their association of beheading videos with signs of 
concern. Beheading videos are not mentioned in Prevent training, so the association of 
viewing such videos with radicalisation comes from popular media. When asked if they 
would make a Prevent query about someone who watched beheading videos, 74% of 
respondents said ‘yes’ (without any reference to the ‘care and support needs’ generally 
needed for a concern to become relevant to safeguarding procedures). 21% ‘didn’t know’ 
and only 5% said they wouldn’t make a Prevent referral on this basis. 
Figure 6: If you saw a patient or staff member watching video clips of beheadings, would 
you make a safeguarding query? 
 Other criteria which healthcare staff strongly associated with radicalisation included hate 
speech about ethnicities, sexualities and other minority groups. An enormous 82% of 
respondents reported that they would be ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ likely to make a Prevent 
query upon hearing such hate speech. Only 15% were ‘not likely’ or ‘very unlikely’ to make 
such a referral. While it is important to challenge hate speech in the workplace, the Prevent 
training does not specify that such illiberal opinion indicates radicalisation. However upon 
the launch of the Prevent Duty, Education Secretary Nicky Morgan did identify vocal 
homophobia as a potential sign of radicalisation (BBC News 2015).5 
Figure 7: If a patient or staff member made hateful statements against an ethnicity, 
sexuality, or another minority group, how likely is it that you would make a safeguarding 
query?   
 
            
 
                                                          
5 We are grateful to Reviewer 1 for alerting us to this. 
However, interests in political events, possessing unpleasant opinions, or reading religious 
philosophy are not necessarily indications of radicalisation. NHS England has itself 
emphasised this in the most recent policy guidance for implementing the Prevent Duty: 
Professionals should also have due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty and be sensitive 
in their considerations. Outward expressions of faith or an interest in global or political 
events, or opinions that may seem unpleasant, in the absence of any other indicator of 
vulnerability or risk are not reason to make a referral to Channel. (NHS England 2017: 14) 
 
And yet, our study indicates that NHS healthcare professionals in the Midlands are inclined 
to draw such conclusions and to potentially make Prevent referrals on these grounds. 
 
Conclusions 
In the era of ‘after, after 9/11’ in the UK, terrorism prevention has come to be framed as the 
extension of safeguarding. This framing of peer-to-peer counterterrorism surveillance as a 
banal measure of care has ensured the successful rollout of the Prevent Duty throughout 
the public sector. However, upon examination, there is an imperfect fit between Prevent 
and safeguarding in the healthcare sector (where Prevent is applied to people with formal 
care and support needs). We have  raised concerns that the Prevent Duty deemphasises the 
formal care and support needs which legitimate protective intervention in an adult’s life, 
replacing them with vague (and circular) notions of vulnerability to extremist rhetoric. We 
also showed the various strategies healthcare professionals deploy to negotiate the tensions 
of Prevent in the NHS, including the highlighting of ‘grey areas’ in normal safeguarding 
practice and the reframing of Prevent pathways as a way to redistribute care resources to 
those excluded by society. 
Outside the realm of formal definitions and their interpretation by safeguarding experts, we 
also discussed the everyday experience of NHS staff with Prevent. After describing the 
content and pedagogy of the WRAP training product, we analysed the attitudes of 329 NHS 
staff to the Prevent Duty and their conceptions of radicalisation. Here we found that the 
majority of those surveyed approved of the Duty, but were somewhat unconvinced of its 
status as genuine safeguarding. More concerning were the prominent trends within survey 
data which showed how staff associate radicalisation with philosophy possession and with 
hate speech. Illiberal attitudes and beliefs are being associated with radicalisation. Finally 
we expressed grave concerns that only 1 in 3 respondents considered themselves confident 
to tell the difference between radicalisation and an interest in Middle Eastern wars and 
politics. Our survey results raise concerns that WRAP training generates a significant 
number of inappropriate referrals, some of which are removed from the system by the local 
safeguarding team, whereas others are deemed ‘misguided’ by the Police Prevent Lead or 
Local Authority.  
No figures exist for referrals which are deemed irrelevant or misguided by safeguarding 
teams or police. These fail to reach the Prevent Case Management system. But the figures 
for those referrals which do reach the Prevent Case Management system demonstrate a 
remarkably high attrition rate. Only 5% of formal Prevent referrals in 2016 and 2017 were 
judged to require a deradicalisation mentor (Home Office 2017; 2018). Instead, the figures 
for 2017 show that 36% of formal referrals were abandoned6, and 45% were given support 
from housing, education or health services.  The remaining 19% were discussed at Channel 
Panel, of which a minority (5% of all formal referrals) received mentoring (Home Office 
2018). 
Before the statutory duty was introduced in 2015, this figure for mentoring (and thus the 
formal accuracy of Prevent referrals) was much higher. 20% of referrals went on to receive 
mentoring support from Channel. But since the introduction of the Prevent Duty, the total 
number of referrals has jumped from 500-1000 per year to 7,631 in 2015/16 (Home Office 
2017). As Thomas Martin argues, this enormous increase in referral numbers – and the drop 
to 5% receiving Channel mentoring - reflects the responsibilisation of the public sector for 
counter-radicalisation and the prospect of censure for non-compliance (Martin 2018). Legal 
obligation has increased the numbers of referrals but not their quality. 
This remarkably high failure rate of the Prevent Duty to identify subjects who require 
deradicalisation mentoring also speaks to the impact of the safeguarding framing and 
economic austerity. The provision of normal safeguarding support (housing, mental health 
care, education) to 45% of Prevent referrals distracts attention from the small number of 
people deemed to actually require deradicalisation intervention. But why couldn’t these 
outcomes be obtained through normal social service provision, rather than a counter-
terrorism pathway? The context of economic austerity in the United Kingdom has 
diminished the capacities of the public sector to respond to social needs, and we find that 
the Prevent Strategy is gradually filling the gap – while simultaneously enabling surveillance 
(Heath-Kelly 2017a). 
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